

STATES, REGIMES AND INSTITUTIONS

MASTER IN SOCIAL SCIENCES (Carlos III-Juan March Institute of Social Sciences, IC3JM)

Course 2024/25

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1. Objectives and structure

The purpose of this course is to analyze the process democratization in comparative perspective. The course is divided into three parts. We start by analyzing the historical evolution of representative democracy and the reason for the central role of competitive elections for distinguishing political regimes in contemporary political science. Then we discuss the different macro explanations that have been offered about democratization, their differences, and possible complementarity. These explanations will be distinguished by their economic or political perspectives and by their emphasis on domestic or international factors. In a second part, we will examine in detail the different institutional developments and reforms that marked the transition from autocracy to democracy: state building, the emergence of executive constraints, the adoption of universal male suffrage, the secret vote, and the representation of political minorities. In the third part, we conclude with a discussion of the problem of majority rule in representative democracies and the phenomenon of democratic backsliding and resistance.

While the course broadly falls within the field of Comparative Politics, we will also examine contributions from Political Economy, Political Theory, and History. Its content is mainly substantive, but there will be an emphasis on methodological issues, such as the logic of comparison, counterfactuals, and statistical models. Finally, whereas important explanations of democratization and democratic institutional change have been inspired by political developments in Western Europe, we will also discuss whether and how they apply to other regions of the world, such as Eastern Europe and Latin America.

2. Class dynamics

The classes are based on a discussion of the topics and the readings (all readings will be available in Aula Global). Students are expected to read all the required materials before the session. Each session will be divided into three parts: a general presentation of the class topic by the professor, a critical presentation of the readings by a student based on a previously written report, and a general discussion on the topic of the day. It is essential that every student participates in class discussions.

3. Evaluation

The grade will be based on three criteria: 1) informed participation in class (10%), 2) previously assigned written reports discussing the topic and the readings of the day (20%), and 3) a research paper (70%).

The written reports should be short (no more than three pages doble space) and cannot consist of a simple summary of the readings. They must contain a critical analysis of the content of the articles or books assigned and formulate a series of questions for general discussion in the class. The critical analysis can focus on the internal consistency of the arguments, on methodological issues, or on the scope of empirical applications. Students must submit the reports before each session.

The research paper will be delivered at the end of the exam period. It must have between 3,000 and 6,000 words (excluding tables, references, and notes). The paper must satisfy the requirements of a journal article in terms of style, presentation, and references. It must present a clear research question, formulate a hypothesis, and present an empirical analysis. The empirical analysis can be quantitative, qualitative, or both, but the method must be justified based on the research question. If case studies are used, the logic of case selection must be explicitly discussed and explained. Do not rush with the formulation of the research question for the paper, it is better if you first become familiar with the literature. The last session will be devoted to discuss paper proposals.

Schedule

Part 1. Conceptual Foundations and Macro Explanations

Week 1 (September 10). Democracy and dictatorship in comparative perspective

Required

- Carles Boix, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. 2014. “A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 12 (2012), pp. 1523-1554.
- J. Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. 2008. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-41.
- Michael Coppedge and John Gerring et al. 2011. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach,” *Perspective on Politics*, Vol. 9: 2, pp. 247-267

Suggested

- Carl H. Knutsen and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2022. “The Ups and Downs of Democracy, 1789-2018.” In M. Coppedge, A. B. Edgell, C. H. Knutsen and S. I.

Lindberg (eds), *Why Democracies Develop and Decline* (Cambridge University Press), 29-54.

Further reading

- Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (Routledge, 2010 [1942]).
- Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition* (Yale University Press, 1972).
- Adam Przeworski. 1999. “Minimalist conception of democracy: A Defense”, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds, *Democracy's Value*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 23-55 (Discussion).
- Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Álvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. |New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Adam Przeworski. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- J.A. Cheibub, J. Gandhi, and J.R. Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited”, *Public Choice*, Vol. 143, No. 1 (2010), pp. 67-101.
- S. Levitsky and L.A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. 3-36 (Discussion)

Week 2 (September 17). Economic development, redistribution, and social classes

Required

- Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and facts.” *World Politics* 49(2): 155-183.
- Daron Acemoglu y James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Chap. 2. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Christian Houle. 2009. “Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization.” *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 589-622

Suggested

- Michael Coppedge et al. 2022. *Why Democracies Develop and Decline*, Chap. 5. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Further reading

- Seymour Lipset. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” *American Political Science Review*, 53(1): 69-105.
- Landman, T. 1999. “Economic Development and Democracy: The View from Latin America.” *Political Studies*, 47(4), 607–626.
- Carles Boix. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Daron Acemoglu y James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ben Ansell y David Samuels. 2014. Inequality and Democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 3 (September 24). Political elites, institutions, and parties

Required

- Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” *Comparative Politics* 2(3): 337-363.
- Adam Przeworski. 1988. “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts.” In Jon Elster y Rune Slagstad, *Constitutionalism and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Daniel Ziblatt. 2017. *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy*, Caps. 1 y 2. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Suggested

- Robert Kaufmann y Stephan Haggard. 2016. *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. New Haven: Princeton University Press, Chap. 2.

Further reading

- Robert Dahl. 1971. *Polyarchy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- John Higley and Richard Gunther. 1992. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruth Collier. 1999. *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Dan Slater y Joseph Wong. 2013. “The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia”, *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 11 (3): 717-733.

Week 4 (October 1). International factors

- Seva Gunitsky. 2014. “From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century.” *International Organization*, 68(3): 561-597.
- Kevin Narizny. 2012. “Anglo-American Primacy and the Global Spread of Democracy: An International Genealogy.” *World Politics*, 64 (2): 341-373.
- Scott Mainwaring and Anibal Perez Liñan. 2005. “Latin American Democratization since 1978”. In Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring (eds.), *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America. Advances and Setbacks*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 14-59.

Suggested

- Jean Teorell. 2010. *Determinants of Democratization. Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chap. 4.

Further reading

- Michael Coppedge et al. 2022. *Why Democracies Develop and Decline*, Chap. 4. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Part 2. Institutional Evolution and Reform

Week 5 (October 8). State building and nation building

Required

- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2019. *The Narrow Corridor. States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, New York: Penguin, Intro, Ch. 1.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. “States and democracy”. *Democratization* 21 (7): 1326-1340.
- Andreas Wimmer. 2018. *Nation Building. Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart* (Princeton University Press): Intro, Ch. 1, Ch. 5.

Further reading

- Scott Abramson. 2017. “The Economic Origins of the Territorial State.” *International Organization*, 71(1): 97-130.
- Liah Greenfield. 2019. *Nationalism. A Short History*. Brookings Institution. Read Introduction, Ch. 4 and Conclusions.

- Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, eds. 2016. *The State-Democracy Nexus: Conceptual Distinctions, Theoretical Perspectives, and Comparative Approaches*. New York: Routledge.
- Sebastian Mazzuca. 2021. *Latecomer State Formation: Political Geography and Capacity Failure in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 6 (October 15). Executive constraints and accountability

Required

- Downing, Brian. 1992. *The Military Revolution and Political Change: The Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, Chs. 1 and 10.
- Przeworski, Adam, Tamar Asadurian, and Anjali Thomas Bohlken. 2012. “The Origins of Parliamentary Sovereignty”. In Tom Ginsburg (ed.), *Comparative Constitutional Design*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Congleton, Roger D. 2007. “From Royal to Parliamentary Rule without Revolution: The Economics of Constitutional Change within Divided Governments,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 23, pp. 261–84.

Further reading

- Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, “Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy”, in *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Adam Przeworski et al (eds), 1999, pp. 279-296.

Week 7 (October 22). Universal suffrage

- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2000. “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective”, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 115, Nov.4.
- Adam Przeworski. 2009. “Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions”, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 291-321.
- Raul Madrid. 2019. “Opposition Parties and the Origins of Democracy in Latin America”. *Comparative Politics*, January 2019.

Further reading

- Stein Rokkan. 1961. “Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation”, *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 2: 132-152.

- John R. Freeman and Duncan Snidal. 1982. “Diffusion, Development and Democratization: Enfranchisement in Western Europe”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, pp. 299-329.
- J. Samuel Valenzuela. 1985. *Democratización Via Reforma: La Expansión del Sufragio en Chile*. Buenos Aires: IDES, Introducción y Cap. 1.
- Hilda Sabato y Marcela Ternavasio. 2011. “El voto en la república. Historia del sufragio en el siglo XIX”, en H. Sabato, M. Ternavasio, L. De Prvitellio, y A. V Persello, eds. *Historia de las Elecciones en Argentina. 1805-2011*. Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, pp. 17-28, 59-82.
- Ben Ansell and David Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 8 (October 29). Secret vote

Required

- Adam Przeworski. 2015. “Suffrage and Voting Secrecy in General Elections”, in Jon Elster *Secrecy and Publicity in Votes and Debates*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Isabella Mares. 2015. *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting*. Chaps. 1 and 2. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jean-Marie Baland y James Robinson. 2008. “Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile”, in *American Economic Review* 98:5.

Further reading

- Jan Teorell, Daniel Ziblatt, and Fabrice Lehoucq. 2016. “Introduction to Special Issue: The Causes and Consequences of Secret Ballot Reform”, *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Toke Aidt and Peter Jensen. 2016. “From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization”, *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Lucas Leeman and Isabela Mares. 2011. “From Open Secrets to Secret Ballot: The Economic and Political Determinants of Secret Ballot Reform”. Columbia University.
- Samuel Valenzuela. 2000. “La ley electoral de 1890 y la democratización del régimen político chileno”, en Carlos Malamud (ed.), *Legitimidad, representación y alternancia en España y América Latina: las reformas electorales (1880-1930)*. Ciudad de México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Luciano de Prvitellio. “Que Reformó la Reforma? La Quimera Contra la Maquina y el Voto Secreto Obligatorio”, *Estudios Sociales* 43, pp. 29-58

Week 9 (November 5). Protection of electoral minorities

Required

- Josep Colomer. 2006. “On the Origins of Electoral Systems and Political Parties. The Role of Elections in Multi-member Districts”. *Electoral Studies* 1-12.
- Amel Ahmed. 2013. *Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Cap. 1.
- Gabriel Negretto and Giancarlo Visconti. 2018. “Electoral Reform Under Limited Party Competition: The Adoption of Proportional Representation in Latin America”. *Latin American Politics and Society* 60 (1).

Further reading

- Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. “The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation. Partisan biases and electoral regime change under increasing party competition”. *World Politics* 61.
- Leeman, Lucas, and Isabela Mares. 2013. "The Adoption of Proportional Representation: One Phenomenon, a Plethora of Explanations." *Journal of Politics* no. 76 (2).
- Rokkan, S. 1970, Citizens, elections, parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development.
- Mazzuca, Sebastian and James Robinson. 2009. “Political Conflict and Power Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia”. *Hispanic American Historical Review* 89: 2.

Part 3. Contemporary Debates

Week 10 (November 12). Democracy and limits on majority rule

Required

- Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw y Barry Weingast. 2010. “Democratization and Countermajoritarian Institutions: Power and Constitutional Design in Self-Enforcing Democracy”. In Tom Ginsburg (ed.), *Comparative Constitutional Design*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 69-100.
- Michael Albertus y Victor Menaldo. 2018. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. Caps. 1-3. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. 2023. *The Tyranny of the Minority*. New York: Penguin, Chaps 1, 5, and 6.

Further reading

- Gabriel Negretto and Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer. 2021. “Constitutional Origins and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis”. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 11, No 2, pp. 522-536.
- Barry Weingast. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law”. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 91, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 245-263.
- Barry Weingast. 2004. “Constructing Self-Democracy in Spain”. En Irwin L. Morris, Joe Oppenheimer, and Karlo Edward Soltan (eds.), *Politics from Anarchy to Democracy: Rational Choice in Political Science*. Stanford University Press.

Week 11 (November 19). Democratic backsliding and resistance

Required

- Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. *How Democracies Die*. Introduction and Chap. 4.
- Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman. 2021. *Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 56-84.
- Michael Bernhard, “Democratic Backsliding in Poland and Hungary”, *Slavic Review* 2021, 1-23.

Suggested

- Weyland, Kurt. 2022 “How Populism Dies: Political Weakness of Personalistic Plebiscitarian Leadership.” *Political Science Quarterly* 137 (1): 9-42.

Further reading:

- Nancy Bermeo. “On Democratic Backsliding”. *Journal of Democracy* Volume 27, Number 1, January 2016, pp. 5-19
- Ozan Varol. 2015. “Stealth Authoritarianism”. *Iowa Law Review* 1673.
- Anna Lührmann et al. 2018. “State of the World 2017: Autocratization and Exclusion?”. *Democratization*.
- David Runciman, *How Democracy Ends* (Profile Books, 2018).
- Adam Przeworski. 2019. *Crises of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Andras Sajó. 2021. *Ruling by Cheating: Governance in Illiberal Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 12 (November 26). Discussion of paper proposals